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CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY IN DIVERSE
SOCIETIES
MARK NOLAN AND KIM RUBENSTEIN
This article examines the relationship
between the legal status of citizenship and
psychological research about blended
identity in diverse societies such as Aus-
tralia. A blended identity could include
Australian national identity as well as
other identities relevant to a person’s self-
definition. Analysing the link between
citizenship law and the psychological en-
joyment of blended identity is important
after the reforms to Australian citizenship
law in 2007. 1  As discussed below, the
former Liberal-National Government intro-
duced a new citizenship knowledge test
for citizenship-by-conferral applicants. In
doing so, that government expressed
strong beliefs about the power of a shared,
unitary, national identity. It also suppor-
ted calls for citizenship applicants to sign
a statement of Australian values (different
to the citizenship pledge) and to complete
an English language test. In light of the
reforms and political debate, we attack the
suggestion that blended identification (for
example, as a Greek Australian) is some-
how inconsistent with true Australian na-
tional identification and citizenship, and
moreover we argue that a single national
identification sits uneasily with the legal
acceptance of dual or multiple citizenship
in current Australian legislation.
We first discuss the concept of blen-
ded identity from a social-psychological
perspective. Then we examine the details
of the 2007 Australian citizenship law re-
forms, bearing in mind that the Rudd
Labor Government recently released the
report of the independent committee re-
viewing the Australian Citizenship Test
and the government response to the re-
port. 2
Legal notions of citizenship and the
psychological experience of blended
identities can often be in tension. This is
understandable since legal and psycholo-
gical concepts of national identity are but
two ways of conceptualising relevant self-
definitions shaping social existence and
belonging in diverse societies. We do not
believe that the legal identity or citizen-
ship always completely defines the self in
practice. However, we argue, as do other
researchers,3  that citizenship law and
psychological identity are in a relationship
of mutual influence creating expectations
about and reactions to legal treatment.
Notions of citizenship and associated
assumptions about psychological identific-
ation that are legally endorsed in diverse
societies have the power to legitimise as
well as de-legitimise the desired enjoyment
of self. Indeed, salient identities shape the
perspective from which many people will
either support or challenge citizenship law
and decision-making processes. The extent
to which the 2007 Australian reforms may
have (de-)legitimised desired self-defini-
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tions will be examined in the final section
of this article. Another way of addressing
this issue is to consider whether citizen-
ship law and application processing satisfy
the basic human need for inclusion and
for adequately expressing and enjoying
all aspects of a blended identity. 4
PSYCHOLOGICAL-SOCIAL
IDENTIFICATION
This section begins by describing a pro-
cess-based understanding of social identi-
fication. For example, an unsuccessful cit-
izenship application results in particular
self-definitions. So too could the existence
of an official policy that treats different
classes of citizens in different ways, such
as testing only civics knowledge, values
and language skills for particular citizen
applicants and not, say, for Australians
who are citizens by birth.
These situations can make a single
identity salient and relevant for self-
definition. However, sometimes such con-
texts can make a more complex blended
social identity salient. For example, an in-
stance of discrimination against Arab
Australians could be relevant for their self-
definition when reacting to felt discrimin-
ation. For example, this inter-group dis-
crimination could result when an intelli-
gence-gathering or policing decision is
based on the assumption that one aspect
of a person’s identity (for example, their
country of birth and/or religion) threatens
national security by weakening their alle-
giance to Australia in some way. These
assumptions and comparisons cause people
to self-select identity or identities. How-
ever, context and comparisons can also
cause people to be treated by others in
terms of an identity even when they do
not wish to so identify.
Both of these identity processes—self-
definition and ascription of identity by
others—narrow the number of identities
used for self-definition. They render other
aspects of self (for example, other identit-
ies based on, say, religion, gender, race,
residence or political orientation) less rel-
evant for shaping the immediate perspect-
ive from which people make social judg-
ments, decisions or policies. This selection
of relevant (or ‘salient’) identity by the
social context has been demonstrated
primarily by research focusing on chan-
ging operative social comparisons, but also
by the nature of the normative content or
ideologies related to salient identities. 5
These contextual changes create iden-
tity management challenges for the social
perceiver, helping them determine the
psychologically best way to self-define or
to respond to an (often unwanted) ascrip-
tion of identity by another. Extending
these process-based theories of single-
identity salience to the study of the simul-
taneous salience of many aspects or dimen-
sions of self-definition 6  constituting one
blended identity is important for under-
standing citizenship and identity in di-
verse societies.
BLENDED IDENTIFICATION
AND ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONSEQUENCES
The concept of blended identity
This article uses the term ‘blended iden-
tity’ to convey the concept that many dif-
ferent aspects or dimensions of self-defin-
ition can be salient simultaneously. In
other words, it includes the situation
where more than one identity simultan-
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eously shapes a person’s self-definition in
a particular social context. The study of
blended identity is controversial, perhaps
mainly due to the fact that some critics
believe that this theoretical notion can be
overstated. Some scholars reject talk of
blended identity as naïve or unrealistic,
concerned that some theorists suggest that
the adoption of a blended identification is
virtually automatic, common and univer-
sally desired. 7  Of course, some migrants
may wish to stop identifying in terms of
an identity that, for example, represents
a tyrannical regime from which they have
escaped. Other critics of the notion of
blended identity suggest that claiming that
blended identification is common is simply
another form of essentialism that suggests
that migrants always identify in terms of
these complex identities. This universalism
is overstated in our view, and fails to ex-
plain the psychological processes determ-
ining when particular identifications oc-
cur. 8  Our use of this concept, alongside
empirical, process-based descriptions of
blended identity salience, should reassure
those critics.
The concept of blended identity has
been discussed by researchers from a
number of different disciplines. Other
common terms include: dual nationality,
dual citizenship, ethnic national identity,
9  hyphenated identity or ethnicity, 10  or
simply mixed identities. In particular, so-
cial psychologists have sometimes labelled
blended identities as ‘crossed categorisa-
tions’ to describe the combination or
‘crossing’ of many identities to form a
complex identity. There have been three
decades of social psychological research
into phenomena flowing from blended
identifications. This has mainly involved
research into how crossed categorisations
shape perceptions of other group mem-
bers. For example, being biased in favour
of your in-group (that is, the identity per-
spective made salient for you by a social
comparison) and distinguishing self from
and/or thinking negatively of out-groups
(that is, groups and their perspectives with
which you do not feel a sense of belonging
in the context of a particular social contro-
versy). 11
The term ‘crossed categorisation’ re-
flects theoretical ideas about social identity
salience described above. In the case of
blended identity salience, the social con-
text makes salient at least two identities,
rather than simply one identity. This more
complex categorisation or definition of the
self is the perspective from which people
determine their identity-based beliefs and
ideologies. 12  Importantly, researchers
study crossed categorisations that include
the salience of national identities as part
of a blended identification. 13
If people have many constituent as-
pects of self, it should not be surprising
that sometimes two or more of these iden-
tities are simultaneously salient and re-
sponsible for shaping our perspective on
a social issue. Perhaps these more complex,
blended identities are in fact more normal
for some people including migrants than
is the simpler case of the salience of only
one (national) identity. The burgeoning
interest in the social psychology of crossed
categorisations is a valuable addition to
citizenship research. It is useful to consult
research on crossed categorisation before
citizenship law reform championing iden-
tification with only one single national
identity is thought superior to celebrating
blended identity.
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Measurement of identification with a
blended identity
Verkuyten studied the relative strength
of religious and national identification in
a sample of 206 Turkish-Dutch citizens
who identified as Sunni Muslims. Atti-
tudes, though not real behaviours, towards
other religious groups in the Netherlands
were also measured. The study was con-
ducted in the context of what Verkuyten
describes as Dutch citizenship policies
promoting assimilation via strong national
identification. 14
Verkuyten found that half of the
sample rated their Islamic identity as
strongly as they could on all measurement
dimensions, choosing seven on a seven-
point rating scale on all measures of the
importance of the Islamic identity. This
ceiling effect or ‘total’ identification as a
Muslim within these blended identities
was interpreted as supporting studies
showing the very high importance of Is-
lamic identity for Muslims living blended
identities in the West. 15
For these ‘total’ Muslim identifiers, the
religious component of identity appeared
a highly central way of defining self in the
social judgment contexts examined. Import-
antly, even though half of the participants
had a ‘Muslim identity [that] was an integ-
ral or inextricable part of how they saw
themselves’, 16  their Dutch national
identification was not eliminated. Their
Dutch national identification was signific-
antly lower than the national identification
of the other half of participants whose Is-
lamic identity was strong though not
‘total’. Those with ‘total’ identification
rated their in-group most positively and
felt strongly about Islamic group rights.
However, Verkuyten could still classify
19 per cent of the ‘total’ Muslim identifiers
as high Dutch identifiers (who rated the
importance of that identity above the
midpoint of the response scale). Also, 31
per cent of high Muslim identifiers simul-
taneously identified as Dutch nationals
and had high levels of national identifica-
tion.
For some, the impact of strong reli-
gious identification upon national identi-
fication could appear alarming. However,
the observable psychological benefits of
these blended identities are an important
part of evaluating any alleged risk of
blended identification. For these ‘totally
identified’ Muslim participants, the most
negative feelings towards other religious
groups in the Netherlands were towards
non-believers. When total Muslim identi-
fication and high national identification
co-occurred, hostility towards other reli-
gious groups (Jews, Christians, Hindus)
decreased. Most negative beliefs about
other Dutch religious groups were held
by total Muslim identifiers with low na-
tional identification, suggesting that hos-
tile beliefs were caused more by a single
rather than a blended identification.
These data suggest the importance of
relationships between each aspect of a
blended identity for resulting social atti-
tudes (that is, beliefs about nationality and
about religious groups to which the per-
ceiver does or does not belong). It does
not suggest, however, that high or total
identification as a Muslim always elimin-
ates or suppresses national identification.
This detail of this study is highlighted as
an example of the type of research that
should be conducted and consulted in or-
der to understand the subtle dynamism of
blended identity expression in political
contexts. The reasons why a blended
identifier does or does not strongly
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identify as a national of their country of
residence is an important social-psycholo-
gical and political question. Not only do
these data suggest the reality of blended
identities and the possibility of identifica-
tion with a blended identity and high na-
tional identification, these data suggest
that detailed measurement of the impact
of citizenship regimes is needed so we can
better understand exactly how and when
citizenship regimes may stifle blended
identities or allow them to exist.
Verkuyten notes too that crossing reli-
gious identity with national identity is an
example of a complex blended identity,
perhaps even more complex than combin-
ing two national identities or, say, lan-
guage groups. 17  It should be remembered
that each example of crossed categorisa-
tion, in political and historical context,
will produce its own unique identity
management challenges. Possible social
tensions that result are not simply a func-
tion of whether blended rather than single
identity salience occurs but are influenced
by relationships between the constituent
identities in a crossed categorisation and
social treatment of these identities.
Common in-group identity research
Some social psychologists argue that adopt-
ing one superordinate, common in-group
identity (for example, Australian) within
diverse societies can reduce tension and
hostile beliefs between groups. However,
some researchers have found this occurs
when valued cultural identities (for ex-
ample, Arab identity) can remain strong
following identification with the common
in-group identity (for example, Australi-
an). 18 This suggests the benefit of blen-
ded identification that prevents mere rec-
ategorisation of all subordinate identities
into a higher-order national identity.
Rather than replacing this diversity with
a unitary national identity, there is benefit
in promoting a superordinate Australian
citizenship that allows explicit and continu-
ing identification with other elements of
a blended identity.
Similarly, important recent empirical
work reveals the impact on in-group bias
when making a common in-group identity
salient whilst measuring how people per-
ceive the relative importance of maintain-
ing a crossed categorisation. 19  In this
work, the perceived importance of the
crossed categorisations determined
whether use of a common in-group iden-
tity (for example, Australian) resulted in
harmony and perceived inclusiveness in-
stead of continuing tension and continuing
perceptions of inter-group difference.
Results showed that when the elements of
a blended identity remained subjectively
important for a perceiver, then identifying
only in terms of a common in-group iden-
tity did not reduce perceived inter-group
tension between subordinate identities.
SOCIAL RESEARCH ON
BLENDED NATIONAL IDENTITY
In this section, social research on blended
identity provides further examples of
blended identification. Two examples are
drawn upon: British Muslims and citizen-
ship, as well as studies of Latin Australi-
ans.
British Muslims and citizenship
In line with other theorists, 20  social psy-
chologists Hopkins et al. suggest that
sensitivity to cultural diversity has also
created a tension between ‘the actuality
of a plurality of social identities and the
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singular identity implied by citizenship’.
21  In terms of self-categorisation theory,
22  these researchers analysed how British
Muslims used Islamic identity to encour-
age or dissuade citizens voting during the
1997 general election. The British National
Party (BNP) claimed that there was a con-
tradiction between being a Muslim and
being a British citizen. Against this polit-
ical backdrop, the Muslim Parliament of
Great Britain asked British Muslims to
boycott the polls and to demand alternat-
ive institutional arrangements through
which they could express their political
views. 23 They also claimed a degree of
identity incompatibility, stating that Brit-
ish Muslims could not be loyal to the La-
bour Party and God at the same time. 24
The Muslim Parliament called for British
Muslims to live up to the example of the
Prophet and to aim for interaction with
the community without integration in
Britain.
To counter that call, the UK Action
Committee on Islamic Affairs cited
Qur’anic verse to produce an anti-boycott
message encouraging British Muslims to
vote in order to fulfil the duty they owed
to Britain. This civic duty as British cit-
izens was asserted to be the same type of
outward-looking, communal duty they
owed as Muslims to other Muslims.
This political debate is a dramatic ex-
ample of how blended identity can be used
for political purposes in a dispute over
citizenship rights (voting and representat-
ive democracy). It demonstrates that
blended identity allows for the possibility
of encouraging, as well as sometimes dis-
suading, civic participation when using
rhetoric derived from all the aspects of a
blended identity. Hopkins et al. state there
is little use concluding that blended iden-
tities will always have negative effects for
national politics and harmony. The re-
searchers note that conceptualising subject-
ive notions of citizenship or blended Brit-
ish Muslim identity as fixed, essentialistic,
homogenous or universally expressed
concepts is misguided. Even if the BNP
believed there was only one essential type
of British Muslim, analysis of the real
political context showed that there could
be at least two British Muslim views on the
importance of voting in the general elec-
tion, both derived from Islamic texts. The
ideological content of blended identifica-
tions and descriptions of citizenship will
vary in line with specific political context
and the political end sought, as may the
case when single category national identit-
ies are used for political purposes. 25
This dynamism should not be per-
ceived as a weakness of blended identific-
ation per se. It is not as if all blended
identities have an essence tending towards
inevitable identity conflict. Rather, the
social constructions revealed in this study
reflected strategic political behaviour from
a salient identity perspective. It demon-
strates that each element of blended iden-
tification can be mutually reinforcing, as
much as they can be antagonistic. In this
sense, the research shows that one group
of highly identified British Muslims sought
political autonomy that downplayed the
significance of British citizenship rights.
The other, a similarly highly identified
group of British Muslims, argued for elec-
tion voting and full civic participation as
a core duty consistent with their Muslim
identity. The latter political approach
demonstrated an ability to unify both as-
pects of their crossed categorisation des-
pite political attack suggesting that a
single British citizenship must prevail as
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it was inconsistent with blended identific-
ation as a British Muslim.
Identification by Latin Australians
Zevallos conducted a study of 13 young
(seventeen to twenty-five year old) women
of Latin American heritage living in Aus-
tralia. 26  Five of the participants were
Australian born, and the remaining eight
had come to Australia between the ages of
two and seven. One finding obtained was
that 11 of the 13 interviewees rejected the
notion that their identities were best cap-
tured by the simple label ‘Australian’; only
two interviewees were happy with that
label, having grown up in Australia.
This rejection of the singular label
Australian did not mean they rarely felt
Australian, or had low attachment to
Australia. Indeed, they felt most Australi-
an, and were treated most as Australians,
when travelling in Latin American coun-
tries. 27 When this salience occurred, they
readily attributed traits, views and beha-
viours to their ‘Australian side’ or to the
Australian influence upon their self-
definition as, say, ‘a South American living
in Australia’. When discussing gender and
sexuality issues, for example, the women
endorsed values of egalitarianism as an
Australian influence. In terms of the cit-
izenship values debate in Australia, it is
noteworthy that use of a blended identity
does not mean these interviewees failed to
endorse values (for example, egalitarian-
ism) that some would claim as Australian.
Most of the women reported that
Australia was considered to be home and
where they hoped to have careers and
children; interviewees contemplated only
holidays in Latin American countries.
However, they still preferred not to be
defined simply as Australian. Based on the
data collected, Zevallos concluded that:
‘There has been no consensus on the best
way to bridge the gap between the ideo-
logy of multiculturalism and an all-encom-
passing Australian identity.’ 28
Perhaps the missing consensus on the
best way to bridge the gap between the
ideology of multiculturalism and an all-
encompassing Australian identity is to
truly celebrate the existence of blended
identities socially, politically and legally.
Indeed, Australian citizenship law has
moved from a rejection of dual or multiple
citizenships to an acceptance and affirma-
tion of these in legislation, to which this
article now turns.
AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP
LAW
Dual or multiple citizenship in Aus-
tralia
From the inception of the Australian Cit-
izenship Act 1948 (Commonwealth) until
4 April 2002, there was a provision man-
dating loss of Australian citizenship for a
person who acquired a new citizenship.
This was found in Section 17 of the act
(‘Loss of citizenship on acquisition of an-
other nationality’). 29
Section 17 and the deterrence of dual
citizenship was one of the most contested
and contentious areas of the Australian
Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth). Dual citizen-
ship was the subject of a 1976 review by
the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs
and Defence and it was also considered in
the context of the national consultations
on multiculturalism and citizenship con-
ducted in 1982. Then, two further reviews
considered the worthiness of s. 17, 30  and
a related parliamentary review of s. 44(i),
which disqualified dual citizens from be-
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coming Members of Parliament, also con-
sidered related policy matters.31
At one level there was a basic inequal-
ity in the system. When citizens of another
country became Australian citizens, the
approach in practice had varied. The
pledge taken upon becoming an Australian
citizen has changed over the years.
Between 1966 and 1986 the words in-
cluded ‘renouncing all other allegiance’.32
However, this wording had no legal
consequence for their status as citizens of
the other country. As a matter of interna-
tional law, it is a question for the country
which bestows citizenship to determine
whether someone loses that citizenship—it
is an incident of sovereignty of that na-
tion-state. The leading case on the ques-
tion of nationality for the purpose of dip-
lomatic protection is the 1955 Nottebohm
case.33
The High Court of Australia confirmed
this in Sykes v. Cleary, 34  in which two
of the people running for Parliament, and
whose positions were challenged, were
citizens of other countries, Greece and
Switzerland, and therefore ineligible under
s. 44(i) of the Australian Constitution.
The issue of dual citizenship became
quite central to the deliberations of the
Australian Citizenship Council. In August
1998, the Howard Government established
the council as an independent body to
advise it on Australian citizenship matters.
In a report at the end of 1999, later pub-
lished as Australian Citizenship for a New
Century, the council made 64 recommend-
ations including the repeal of Section 17.
Considering matters such as globalisation,
the Australian Citizenship Council stated:
[A]s we move into the twenty-first
century, the prevalence of dual
citizenship internationally will
rapidly increase. The law and
practice of most countries with
which Australia likes to compare
itself permits citizens of those
countries to obtain another citizen-
ship without losing their original
citizenship…These countries
simply recognize that they have
an internationally mobile popula-
tion and that they can retain con-
nection with this population even
if another citizenship is ac-
quired.35
This recommendation was acted upon by
the government and implemented in the
2002 amendments to the act, which were
then enhanced by the 2007 reforms to
which discussion now turns.
Howard Government policy reforms in
2007
In 2007, the Howard Government intro-
duced two separate pieces of legislation
on citizenship that had different policy
objectives. The first was the repeal of the
1948 statute with a new Australian Citizen-
ship Act 2007. The second (and after the
first was fully implemented) was an
amendment to the new act introducing
more elaborate citizenship testing.
The 2007 act
The Australian Citizenship Act 2007 came
into force on 1 July 2007. As the Reader’s
Guide to the new act outlines, 36  the ori-
gins of the 2007 act lie with the former
Australian Citizenship Council (the coun-
cil). In its report at the end of 1999, re-
ferred to above, within its 64 recommend-
ations was ‘Refining the structure of the
Australian Citizenship Act 1948’. 37 The
2007 act’s origins lie with that recommend-
ation.
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While all the other substantive
changes to the 1948 act recommended in
the council’s report (such as the repeal of
Section 17 of the former act to allow for
dual citizenship) were implemented in le-
gislation in 2002, this last recommendation
to ‘tidy up’ the act ‘to improve presenta-
tion so it is logically organized, numbered
and consistent, with relevant matters dealt
with together, and ensuring the balance
of matters dealt with between the Act and
the Regulations conforms to modern
standards’ was implemented with the
passage of the Australian Citizenship Act
2007 (the new act).
The act has a more logical structure,
including terminology that is more access-
ible and changes complementing the
policy rationale of the 2002 amendments,
as well as some further changes to assist
Australia in better responding to the threat
of terrorism. 38
The most significant change from the
perspective of this article emanating from
the report was the 2002 repeal of s. 17 of
the original citizenship act. The new 2007
act extended that inclusive approach to
Australian citizenship in various ways,
including broadening the resumption of
citizenship provisions and the extension
of citizenship by descent to children of
people who had lost their Australian cit-
izenship.
These latter changes were part of the
package that could be referred to as inclus-
ive; they were including in the Australian
community many people who had often
seen themselves as Australians, but had
not been recognised formally in law as
such, and importantly for our discussion
of blended identity, included dual citizens
in the fullest legal sense. However, very
soon after the passage of the new legisla-
tion, an amendment act, which was intro-
duced before the core legislation, was
passed,39  underpinned by a less inclusive
policy approach to Australian citizenship,
as set out below.
Citizenship testing
Before the 2007 citizenship test reforms,
citizen-by-conferral applicants generally
had their language ability assessed at inter-
view, though there was no standardised
or objective test of English language profi-
ciency.40 There was no formal written
citizenship knowledge test administered,
save for applicants needing to demonstrate
at interview a satisfactory understanding
of the rights and responsibilities of Aus-
tralian citizenship. Citizenship applicants
then needed to make the Citizenship
Pledge (see below).
Following the passage of the Australi-
an Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship
Testing) Bill 2007, the minister can require
certain applicants to sit a formal citizen-
ship test (which may include English lan-
guage testing as well as civics knowledge
testing).41  A review of the amendment act
is thoroughly canvassed in the Parliament-
ary Bills Digest.42  As part of the new ad-
ministrative system, a resource book is
available for prospective applicants to
read,43  and from which information is
available that will assist applicants in an-
swering the randomly selected questions
drawn from a secret set.
The department publishes Citizenship
Test Snapshot Reports on a regular basis.44
The latest information about the testing
reveals some form of substantive discrim-
ination against test applicants from the
humanitarian migration stream. The report-
ing from the Department of Immigration
and Citizenship indicates that between 1
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October 2007 and 30 June 2008, 48 713
individuals sat the citizenship test and 46
500 (or 95.5 per cent) passed it on their
first or subsequent attempt.45 The pass
rate (on first or subsequent attempt) for
applicants who came to Australia under
the Skilled Stream of the Migration Pro-
gram was 99 per cent compared with 92
per cent for those who came under the
Family Stream and 82 per cent for those
applicants who came under the Humanit-
arian Program. Also, the average number
of tests needed to be taken before passing
per applicant appears greater for humanit-
arian (1.8) compared with family (1.3) and
skilled migrant (1.1) applicants. The num-
ber of test applicants from each migration
stream is as follows: skilled (48 per cent),
family (22.2 per cent) and humanitarian
(11.3 per cent).
THE IMPACT OF AUSTRALIAN
CITIZENSHIP LAW REFORM ON
BLENDED NATIONAL IDENTITY
Below, two possible results of inappro-
priate treatment of blended identities are
considered: 1) increased identification
following threat to one (national) identity;
and 2) variations in identity attachment.
The concept of honourable citizenship46  is
also discussed below as a guide to how
some migrants may wish their blended
identity to be respected: needing their
country of origin to be acknowledged and
respected, rather than demonised or
treated as if it is no longer psychologically
significant. This section of the article con-
siders whether the Howard Government’s
citizenship reforms and policies widen
rather than bridge the gap between citizen-
ship law and healthy psychological enjoy-
ment of blended identity in diverse societ-
ies.
A single Australian identity: is keeping
it simple stupid?
In the citizenship testing discussion
paper, the Howard Government defined
the desired normative content of an Aus-
tralian identity:
Citizenship provides an opportun-
ity for people to maximise their
participation in society and to
make a commitment to Australia’s
common values—which include
the respect for the freedom and
dignity of the individual, our
support for democracy, our com-
mitment to the rule of law, our
commitment to the equality of men
and women and the spirit of a fair
go, or mutual respect and compas-
sion to those in need.47
These values are similar though much
more detailed and, perhaps, ideologically
driven than the current citizenship pledge,
which reads: ‘From this time forward [un-
der God],48  I pledge my loyalty to Aus-
tralia and its people, whose democratic
beliefs I share, whose rights and liberties
I respect, and whose laws I will uphold
and obey.’49
Zevallos cites Kukathas’ warning that
conflict is likely when culturally pluralist-
ic societies such as Australia attempt to
endorse a strong sense of national identity
via reshaping of Australian institutions
(including citizenship law) with the aim
of further defining what it means to be an
Australian.50  In light of these warnings,
the most troubling aspect of the Howard
Government’s rhetoric surrounding its
2007 citizenship reforms was the official
endorsement of citizenship as the celebra-
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tion of a simple, single national identity
and as the best solution to inter-group
tension or personal maladjustment. As at-
tractive and consensual as this focus may
at first appear, it asserts equivalence
between a single citizenship identity and
real psychological identification that may
not exist in all cases. The government’s
preferred approach in 2007 was to encour-
age use of a single ‘superordinate identity’
to all new Australian citizens irrespective
of their migration history and the extent
to which a blended identity was important
to them.
Instead of suggesting that true celebra-
tion of blended identity could create sta-
bility in a diverse society, the Howard
Government’s Discussion Paper on citizen-
ship testing suggested that sustainable
unity came via a simple, single national
identity: ‘Australian Citizenship is the
single most unifying force in our culturally
diverse nation. It lies at the heart of our
national identity—giving us a strong sense
of who we are and our place in the
world.’51
Unlike our thesis—that true recogni-
tion of blended identity may sometimes
reduce social tension—the official endorse-
ment of citizenship in 2007 was linked
simply to identification as Australian;
suggesting that diversity and harmony
was strengthened rather than weakened
by emphasising one Australian national
identity in all contexts and in response to
all social comparisons within Australia.
Testing English language proficiency,
Australian civics knowledge and asking
applicants for an endorsement of Australi-
an values were tools thought by the
Howard Government to facilitate adoption
of this simple (non-blended) identity. No
other route to harmonious multicultural
relations was considered to be as effective.
For example, there was minimal if any
emphasis upon unity in diversity and little
suggestion that the celebration of blended
identity could assist relations in some,
even if not all, possible social contexts.
Identity threat
The Howard Government’s one-citizen-
ship-satisfies-all approach to unity in di-
versity may result in threats to some of
the identities comprising a blended iden-
tity. Much social-psychological research
confirms that one reaction to identity
threat is increased rather than decreased
identification with the threatened identity,
especially for those who strongly identify
with the threatened identity.52  For those
who highly identify with a threatened
identity, and who wish to continue to self-
define in those terms, rejection of a single
Australian identity that threatens other
components of their blended identity
seems likely. This prediction, supported
by results of designed laboratory research,
has also been demonstrated in recent field
studies. For example, in response to assim-
ilationist citizenship policies in the Neth-
erlands, Islamic groups whose religious
identity was threatened strongly identified
with that identity in response to public
condemnation of continuing identification
as a Dutch Muslim.53  Such results would
be at odds with the Howard Government’s
claim that using (simple) notions of Aus-
tralian citizenship and identity was the
single most unifying force in our diverse
society, producing ‘a strong sense of who
we are’.54
Attachment to Australia
Attachment to Australia was important for
the Howard Government in 2007, stating
that:
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Becoming an Australian is much
more than a ceremony. It is an op-
portunity to fully embrace the
Australian way of life, to broaden
education options and employment
opportunities, to vote and to have
a voice in the country’s fu-
ture…People taking up Australian
citizenship are welcomed into one
of the safest, most tolerant and
peaceful societies in the world.55
Davis, in his review of social-psychological
theories of national attachment and his
empirical study of Basque attachment in
Spain, suggests that measuring subjective
attachment to nation is much more com-
plex than measuring values endorsement.
Davis’s review suggests that values-based
attachment is important, though it can be
of less importance than measures of emo-
tional ties to nation or of institutional re-
sponsibilities.56  Even Davis’s analysis of
Basque attachment revealed two distinct
perspectives: ‘guardian nationalism’ and
‘apolitical ethnicity’. Only the former of
those attachment styles was defined cent-
rally around values such as language
maintenance, self-determination and armed
separatism. Davis also emphasised that
careful empirical work was required to
understand subjective attachment to na-
tion for those self-defining in terms of
blended identities; rejecting the utility of
understanding attachment to nation in
terms of commonly asserted and universal
dimensions of attachment.57 Arab Australi-
an Waheed Aly suggests that the Howard
Government’s policy of compulsory lan-
guage testing and knowledge testing was
mooted for political reasons and cannot
provide an effective way to increase the
attachment to Australia or the participa-
tion in civic life:
The tests would ask pointless
questions about Don Bradman58
and Phar Lap,59  not because this
assisted migrants with integration
in any practical way, but because
it was intended to send a symbolic
message to a specific constituency
in the electorate. A sector that
seeks reassurance that the only
migrants who will make it through
are the good ones.60
Aly believes that the testing regime could
emphasise a ‘suffocating…parochial cultur-
al paradigm’61  neither giving practical
help to migrants living in Australia nor
improving social relations and attachment
to Australia.
Honourable citizenship
Ghassan Hage fears that Australians with
blended national identities in diverse soci-
eties such as Australia, who even have
achieved their clear entitlements to citizen-
ship rights, can still feel ‘demeaned as a
human being’62  when accessing rights
offered to them. Hage argues that most
Arab migrants to Australia are ‘reasonably
likely to end up accessing Australian cit-
izenship and/or the rights that come with
it or with residency status’.63 Therefore,
he argues, the real social problems (social
exclusion or isolation, inequality and dis-
crimination) revolve around the ways in
which you must access these rights and how
you feel when doing so.
Hage stresses that citizenship is
primarily about a (psychological) sense of
belonging and about ‘holding your head
high’ as, say, an Arab Australian. Being
able to do so is, in Hage’s terms, to be able
to enjoy honourable citizenship. Such a
form of citizenship in practice is determ-
ined by whether the legal conceptions of
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citizenship or, ‘rule over the self’,64  deliv-
er a sense of dignity, autonomy and hon-
our. He claims that this goes beyond the
common situation in diverse multicultural
societies where refugees or migrants are
offered a chance to belong to Australian
society because they cannot or no longer
wish to live in and identify with their coun-
try of origin. According to Hage, then,
honourable citizenship for dual nationals
means that the mode of accessing rights
and the official displays of inclusion and
recognition should emphasise and celeb-
rate the continued moral worth of all ele-
ments of a blended self-identity.
Hage argues that explicit and transpar-
ent efforts be made to consider the impact
on blended identities when the Australian
Government makes foreign policy or other
official decisions. This, in effect, would
involve considering how actions taken in
the Australian interest may affect those
with salient blended identities.65  Honour-
able citizenship also means that the history
and origin of, for example, an Arab iden-
tity is honoured by being given clear
support as a legitimate identity with past,
present and future moral worth. Making
simpler calls for integration or assimilation
via citizenship and identification as (only)
an Australian, who speaks good English,
has good civics knowledge and who en-
dorses Australian values, may sometimes
be at odds with the notion of honourable
citizenship.66
Hage concludes by encouraging Arab
Australians to treat Australia as a home
and to participate in Australian society
despite their real fears of being discrimin-
ated against and of not being able to live
their blended identities in ways they
would hope.67  In saying so, he hopes Ar-
ab Australians will be encouraged not to
forget their other homes. He also notes that
the movement of people to Australia is
dynamic, continuing and less final than it
may have once been, with many migrant
families now going back and forth rather
than making one-movement migrations to
Australia.68  In contemplating the future
of the citizenship test, the Rudd Govern-
ment should recognise that many Australi-
ans juggle two or more national identities.
For blended identification to be matched
by sensitive laws on dual or multiple cit-
izenship, ‘petty fears of double allegi-
ance’69  must give way in law and practice
to a diverse society in which blended
identification can truly flourish for the
benefit of all.
CONCLUSION
If one goal of Australian citizenship law
is to legally recognise the reality of blen-
ded identities, governments need to create
citizenship law that allows for self-defini-
tion via crossed categorisations. Outward
displays of attachment to and enjoyment
of all aspects of a blended identity should
not engender undue moral panic. Instead,
citizenship should be considered to oper-
ate richly and dynamically in ways similar
to other examples of crossed categorisa-
tions unless evidence exists of unique
psychological process and universally
negative social psychological consequences
for citizenships lived as crossed categorisa-
tions.
This article has explained that some
concerns about blended identifiers—that
they will be more biased or are less at-
tached to Australia—are not sustained by
research evidence. These concerns are
longstanding assumptions that have been
under-researched, even by identity psy-
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chologists.70 The way in which citizen-
ship law and policy creates tension
between elements of blended identities is
important:
These identities do not have to
contradict each other or get in
each other’s way because they are
of different kinds: they are differ-
ently defined or situated on differ-
ent levels of abstraction. One can
be a member of an ethnic group as
well as a superordinate national
category. There is little problem
as long as these identities are not
defined on the same level of ab-
straction and in contrasting or
competing terms. Depending on
the situation the one or the other
is relevant and becomes salient.
However, different identities do
sometimes get in each other’s
way.71
Blended identity salience is a dynamic and
context-dependent process, and is not a
fanciful, postmodern, theoretical concept.
It is the lived reality for many citizens.
The celebration of blended identity rather
than the ascription of an ill-fitting singular
Australian identity may be a better way
to encourage psychological attachment to
the many ways in which Australian citizen-
ship can be enjoyed.
POSTSCRIPT
The Rudd Government released the report
of the Australian Citizenship Test Review
Committee, Moving Forward…Improving
Pathways to Citizenship, and the govern-
ment response to that report after this
article was written (see <http://www.cit-
izenshiptestreview.gov.au/index.htm>).
Kim Rubenstein was a member of the
committee. When the government releases
the new citizenship test and the pathways
to taking the test as a result of its response
to the report, we will then be able to con-
sider how well the changes deal with the
issues raised in this paper.
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